MENAHEM E. YAARI
It should be noted that the continuity assumed in A3 is stronger than that required for the development of standard expected utility theory. (The reason for this will become apparent shortly.) AXIOM A4-Monotonicity (with respect to first-order stochastic dominance): If G,(t) ) Gv(t) for all t, O -t 1, then Gu G,.
With Axioms A1-A4 in hand, one can proceed to write down an appropriate independence axiom and obtain the result that preferences are representable by expected utility comparisons. Specifically consider: AXIOM A5EU-Independence: If G, G', and H belong to F and a is a real number satisfying O0 a < 1, then G > G' implies aG+ (1 -a)H > aG'+ (1 -a)H. Moreover, the function 4, which is unique up to a positive affine transformation, can be selected in such a way that, for all t satisfying 0< t 1, 4(t) solves the preference equation
(3) [1; (t)]-~[t; 1].
PROOF: See, e.g., Fishburn (1982, Theorem 3, p. 28). It follows readily from Axioms A2-A4 and A5EU that the premises of Fishburn's theorem hold, with the unit interval acting as the set of consequences and with distributions representing probability measures. The conclusion, therefore, is that a function 4 satisfying (2) exists, uniquely up to a positive affine transformation and, moreover, that equation (3) provides the construction of b. That F is continuous and nondecreasing follows directly from A3 and A4, respectively, in conjunction with (3). Finally, the fact that the converse also holds is established by straightforward verification.
Q.E.D.
The dual theory of choice under risk is obtained when the independence axiom of expected utility theory (Axiom A5EU) is taken and, so to speak, "laid on its side." Instead of independence being postulated for convex combinations which are formed along the probability axis, it will now be postulated for convex combinations which are formed along the payment axis. The best way to do this is to consider appropriately defined inverses of distribution functions.
Let G e F, so that G is the DDF of some v e V. Now define a set-valued function, G, by writing, for 0-t 1,
G(t) ={xl G(t) x G(t-)}
where G(t-) = lim_,t,s<t G(s) for t > 0, and G(0-) = 1. G is simply the set-valued function which "fills up" the range of G, to make it coincide with the unit interval. The values of G are closed and for each p, 0< p -1, there exists some t such that p E G(t). Using G, we may now proceed to define the (generalized) inverse of G, to be denoted G-1, by writing (4) G-l(p) = min{tpG(t)}.
Note that G-', like G, belongs to F and that, for all GeF, (G-1)-= G.
Furthermore, if G and H belong to r and 11 I1 stands for L1-norm, then 11 G -H = I G-1-H-1j. Of course, if G is invertible, then G-1 is just the usual inverse function of G.
A mixture operation for DDF's may now be defined as follows: If G and H belong to r and if 0 < a < 1, then aG EB (1 -a)H is the member of F given by ( 
5) aG l (1-a)H= (aG-+ (1-a)H-1)-1
If J = aG E (1-a)H, for some 0< a s 1, then I shall say that J is a harmonic convex combination of G and H. With the operation E3, the set F of all DDF's becomes a mixture space, in the sense of Herstein and Milnor (1953) . Returning to the preference relation >t, we are now in a position to state the axiom that gives rise to the dual theory of choice under risk: AXIOM A5-Dual Independence: If G, G' and H belong to r and a is a real number satisfying 0< a < 1, then G > G' implies aG E (1 -a )H > aG'B (1 -a) H.
The economic significance of this axiom will be discussed in Section 3, below. The following representation theorem is now available: THEOREM 1: A preference relation > satisfies Axioms A1-A5 if, and only if, there exists a continuous and nondecreasing real function f, defined on the unit interval, such that, for all u and v belonging to V,
Moreover, the function f, which is unique up to a positive affine transformation, can be selected in such a way that, for allp satisfying 0 ~ p < 1, f(p) solves the preference equation Let v belong to V, with DDF Gv, and let U(v) be defined by
with f defined in (7). Theorem 1 tells us that the function U is a utility on V, when preferences satisfy A1-A5. The hypothesis of the Dual Theory is that agents will choose among random variables so as to maximize U. This is in analogy (and in contrast) with the hypothesis of expected utility theory, which is that agents choose among random variables so as to maximize the function W, given by Let > satisfy A1-A5, and let f be defined by (7). The phrase "f represents >" will be used as convenient shorthand for the much longer phrase "the function U, derived from f in (9), is a utility representing "."
The utility U of the dual theory has two noteworthy properties: First, U assigns to each random variable its certainty equivalent. In other words, if v belongs to V, then U(v) is equal to that sum of money which, when received with certainty, is considered by the agent equally as good as v. The second important property of U is linearity in payments: When the values of a random variable are subjected to some fixed positive affine transformation, the corresponding value of U undergoes the same transformation. The following propositions provide a precise statement of these properties. We know, from (7) and (3), that f(p) is the value of t that solves (11), while +(t) is the value of p that solves (11). It follows, therefore, that f= 4-1. Of course, when writing f= k-1, we should not lose sight of the fact that only one of the two functions, 4 and f can be relevant to the characterization of the agent's overall behavior in risky situations.
THE MEANING OF DUAL INDEPENDENCE
In the foregoing section, dual independence (Axiom A5) appeared without an economic interpretation. My aim now is to re-state A5 in a way that will make its economic content clear.
Consider once again the set V of random variables, on which preferences are defined, and let (S, I, P) be the underlying probability space. Note that here we are dealing with ordinary convex combinations of real functions and that au + (1-a)w is not a probability mixture of u and w.
It turns out that A5 and A5* are, in fact, equivalent:
PROPOSITION 3: Let > be a preference relation on V, satisfying Axiom Al. Then, > satisfies Axiom A5* if, and only if, the corresponding preference relation among DDF's (also denoted ) satisfies Axiom A5.
PROOF: Under Axiom Al, the underlying probability space can be chosen to suit our convenience, as long as all DDF's in F can be generated. Accordingly, let (S, I, P) consist of the unit interval, the Borel sets, and Lebesgue measure. Now let u, v, and w be pairwise comonotonic and suppose that A5 holds. We must show that u > v implies au +(1 -a)w > av +(1 -a)w, where 0 < a 1. By comonotonicity, there exists a measure-preserving transformation, mapping the unit interval onto itself which, when composed with any of the random variables u, v, and w, rearranges it in nonincreasing order, without affecting its distribution. Thus, without loss of generality, we may assume not only that u, v, and w are pairwise comonotonic, but that each one of them is a nonincreasing function on the unit interval. Moreover, having selected Lebesgue measure for the underlying probability measure, we find that the right-continuous inverse of u, u -, is precisely the DDF Gu of u, and similarly for v and w. Therefore, the assertion that Gu G, implies aGv E (1 -a)Gw aGv E (1-a)Gw in A5 reduces precisely to u v MENAHEM E. YAARI implying au +(1-a)w > av +(1-a)w. Conversely, let G, G', and H belong to r and assume that A5* holds. We must show that
G>G'
implies aG E(1-a)HaG'W (1-a)H, for Oa<1.
Defining u, v, and w to be the inverses of G, G', and H, respectively, we find that u, v, and w are pairwise comonotonic so, by A5*, u v implies au+ (1-a)w av+(1 -a)w. This assertion, when written in terms of preference among DDF's, gives the desired result, and the proof is complete.
The foregoing proposition makes it clear that the economic interpretation of dual independence lies in the intuitive meaning of comonotonicity. Recall that comonotonicity is a distribution-free property, in the sense that it is invariant under changes in the underlying probability measure. It is, in fact, an analogue of perfect correlation for this distribution-free setting. When two random variables are comonotonic, then it can be said that neither of them is a hedge against the other. The variability of one is never tempered by counter-variability of the other. (A discussion of this no-hedge condition appeared in Yaari (1969) , where comonotonic random variables were referred to as "bets on the same event.") Suppose, for example, that u and v are random variables such that u > v. Would this preference be retained when both u and v are mixed, half and half, with some third random variable, say w? (Recall that we are not dealing here with a probability mixture, but rather with a pointwise averaging of the values of the two random variables.) If the agent whose preferences are being discussed is risk averse, and w is a hedge against v but not against u, then this agent might well have reason to reverse the direction of preference: i.e., the assertions u t v and v + w > u + w will both be true. Similarly, if the agent for whom u > v is true is risk seeking, and w is a hedge against u but not against v, then, once again, there will be reason for the agent to reverse the direction of preference as above. Thus, the demand that u v should imply au +(1 -a)w >av +(1 -a)w seems to be justified only in the case where w is neither a hedge against u nor a hedge against v. This is precisely what dual independence says. Actually, dual independence is weaker, in that the conclusion is only required to hold when u and v themselves are not a hedge against each other; This further weakening becomes important when the agent's initial wealth is allowed to vary. In this paper, however, variations in initial wealth will not be considered.
We see, in summary, that dual independence requires the direction of preference to be retained under mixing of payments, provided hedging is not involved. Two comments are in order at this point.
(a) Comonotonicity, i.e. the no-hedge condition, is sensitive to random variables being changed on sets of probability zero. In a recent paper, Roell (1985) has adopted a weaker notion of comonotonicity, defined with joint distributions, which is invariant under changes occurring on sets of probability zero. R6ell then uses this alternative definition in an axiom like A5*.
(b) Axiom A5* is, of course, quite strong, and one could think of weakening it in the following way: Suppose that u, v, and w are pairwise comonotonic and that u t v. Then, au + ( -a)w > av +(1 -a)w should be required to hold only if w is relatively a better hedge against u than against v. (Presumably, one could try to define the relation "relatively a better hedge..." using correlation coefficients.) This condition would weaken the notion of independence, in comparison with A5*, while simultaneously restricting the analysis to the case of a risk averse agent. Exploring the resulting theory would be, it seems to me, an interesting task. Here, A5* will be maintained, with risk aversion to be treated separately (see Section 5, below).
PARADOXES AND DUAL PARADOXES
Behavior which is inconsistent with expected utility theory has been observed systematically, and often such behavior has been branded "paradoxical." As it turns out, behavior which is "paradoxical" under expected utility theory is, in many cases, entirely consistent with the dual theory. This does not mean, however, that the dual theory is "paradox-free." We find, on the contrary, that for each "paradox" of expected utility theory, one can usually construct a "dual paradox" of the dual theory, by interchanging the roles of payments and probabilities. Under these "dual paradoxes," reasonable behavior-and probably easily observable behavior-is found to be inconsistent with the dual theory and to be entirely in keeping with expected utility theory. I would like to illustrate this, using a couple of prominent examples.
A famous "paradox" of expected utility theory is the so-called common ratio effect: Dividing all the probabilities by some common divisor reverses the direction of preference. Kahnemen and Tversky ( This inequality is satisfied, for example, when f is of the form f(p) = p/(2-p), for 0 < p < 1. (This f is in fact risk averse, as we shall see in Section 5.) Now, to get a "dual paradox" for the common ratio effect, we must look for a case where dividing all the payments by some common factor would lead to preference reversal. In order to obtain such behavior, which would clearly be inimical to the dual theory, we would have to gather a group of subjects, pay each one of them $5 per hour for "Participating in an Interesting Experiment on MENAHEM E. YAARI Decision Making" and proceed to elicit from these subjects a pattern of responses which is inconsistent with constant relative risk aversion. Alas, I cannot claim to have done this. But happily I join the critics of the dual theory in saying that such "deviant" behavior is, no doubt, quite common.
A similar state of affairs exists with Allais' celebrated paradox (Allais (1953) ). On the one hand, the non-expected-utility preference pattern, which Allais had found prevalent, turns out to be consistent with the dual theory. On the other hand, examples can be found which resemble Allais' gambles-with the roles of payments and probabilities reversed-where one would expect to observe behavior which is inconsistent with the dual theory while being consistent with expected utility theory. I shall omit the details.
Proceeding now to the theory of income distribution, we find yet another "paradox": Newbery (1979) has shown that there does not exist a von NeumannMorgenstern utility whose expected value ranks distributions (with a fixed mean) in the same order as their Gini coefficients of equality. (The Gini coefficient of equality is defined as twice the area under the Lorenz Curve.) Under expected utility theory, it is "irrational" to evaluate income distributions according to the Gini coefficient. Given the frequency with which the Gini has actually been used for comparing income distributions, Newbery's finding is surely as much a paradox of expected utility theory as the common ratio effect or Allais' gambles. Under the dual theory, the paradox disappears. In fact, if we let the function f of Theorem 1 be given by f(p) = p2 for <Op p 1, we find that, for DDF's with a fixed integral, the ordering induced by the integral Jf(G(t)) dt is precisely the Gini equality ordering. Indeed, for mean-normalized distributions, the quantity J (G(t))2 dt is precisely the Gini equality coefficient for G. This result is due to Dorfman (1979) . Now, as might be expected, it is easy to think of a "paradox" that would be the dual of the foregoing: Just as Gini-type measures of equality (or of inequality) are not rationalizable under expected utility theory, so Atkinson's (1970) measures of equality (or of inequality) are not rationalizable under the dual theory. The fact that risk aversion is characterized in the dual theory by the convexity of f has a useful interpretation when f happens to be differentiable. Let v belong to V, with DDF Gv, and let U(v) be the utility number assigned to v under the dual theory, i.e., U(v) = Jf(Gv(t)) dt. Iff is differentiable, then the expression for U(v) can be integrated by parts to obtain U(v)= tf'(Gv(t)) dFv(t), where Fv is the cumulative distribution of v. Note that Jf'(Gv(t)) dFv(t) = 1, i.e., {If(GJ(t))} is a system of nonnegative weights summing to 1, and recall that
f t dFv(t) is the mean of v. In U(v), a similar integral is being calculated, but each t is given a weight f'(Gv(t)). In other words, U(v) is a corrected mean of v, in which the payment level t receives a weight of size f'(Gv(t)). Iff is convex, then f is nondecreasing; i.e., those values of t for which Gv(t) is small receive relatively low weights and those values of t for which Gv(t) is large receive relatively high weights. Thus, U(v) is a corrected mean of v, in which low
payments (bad outcomes) receive relatively high weights while high payments (good outcomes) receive relatively low weights. The agent behaves pessimistically, as though bad outcomes are more likely than they really are and good outcomes are less likely than they really are. It should be emphasized however, that this is not a case where probabilities are being distorted in the agent's perception. For the analysis undertaken in this essay deals with how perceived risk is processed into choice, and not with how actual risk is processed into perceived risk. This is necessarily true in any theory that subscribes to the neutrality axiom, Al. Let (S, X, P) be the probability space underlying the set V, over which preferences are defined. Then, the measure P must be interpreted as the agent's perceived probability measure, whether it coincides with some "objective" probability measure or not. If P were a measure that was liable to be modified (or "distorted") before entering the agent's choice process, then assuming neutrality with respect to P would have been completely unwarranted.
Having seen how risk aversion is characterized under the dual theory, one is led to ask about how the degree of risk aversion might be assessed, and to seek tools for carrying out comparisons of risk aversion. These topics are taken up in a separate paper (Yaari (1986) ).
LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
One of the hallmarks of expected utility theory is its treatment of portfolio selection. It is therefore interesting to see how the dual theory would cope with this classical topic. We begin by considering Tobin's (1958) basic liquidity preference problem.
There are two assets: A safe asset (cash) and a risky security. The rate of return on cash is 0 and the rate of return on the risky security is 0, where 0 is a random variable distributed on the interval [-1, a], for some a > 0. One must assume, of course, that EO> 0. A decision maker wishes to invest a fixed amount K, satisfying 0< K< 1/(1l+a), and faces the problem of dividing this amount between cash and the risky security. Let x be the amount invested in the risky security, 0 < x < K. Then, the decision maker's gross return from his/her portfolio is given by the random variable K + Ox, which belongs to the class V of the previous sections.
Let > be the decision maker's preference order on V, and assume that > satisfies Axioms A1-A5 of Section 2. Then, by Theorem 1, there exists a continuous and nondecreasing real function f, satisfying the preference equation (7) The term "plunging" must not be confused with risk seeking. Indeed, consider a risk averse investor. Under the dual theory, the behavior of such an agent can be described, so to speak, as waiting in the wings until the rate of return is high enough, and then going whole hog. Under expected utility theory, on the other hand, diversification is universal, in the sense that the amount invested in the risky security is always positive, sometimes reaching the total available for 110 MENAHEM E. YAARI investment. This point deserves to be emphasized: Under expected utility, a risk averse investor will always put some resources into a risky security, provided its expected rate of return is positive. I am prepared to argue that both positions-"never stay put" in expected utility theory and "stay put until plunging becomes justified" in the dual theory-are extreme. Real investment behavior probably lies somewhere in between. The dual theory, because of its linearity property, tends to produce corner solutions in optimization problems. This is why we get plunging behavior in the foregoing liquidity preference problem. However, it is easy to think of more complex portfolio problems, where diversification and corner solutions can coexist. Let us consider, for example, a three asset portfolio selection problem, with a safe asset (cash) earning no return and two risky securities whose rates of return are independent, identically distributed random variables. Under the dual theory, a risk averse investor facing this situation will either hold his/her assets in cash or in a diversified portfolio consisting of the two risky securities in equal amounts. Letting 0 be the random variable describing the rate of return on this mixed asset and letting x be the amount invested in it, we find that Proposition 4 is applicable as it stands for the analysis of the investor's decision in this situation. An analysis of the general portfolio selection problem, in a dual theory setting, appears in Roell (1985) .
We come now to the question of comparative statics. I shall claim that, despite the awkwardness brought about by corner solutions, the dual theory possesses desirable comparative statics properties. The framework, once again, will be that of the basic, two asset, liquidity preference problem. Recall that, under the dual theory, optimal behavior in this setting is determined by the constant c, given in (15). Plunging is optimal if c> 0, and holding back is optimal if c <0. The constant c, therefore, acts like a measure of the agent's propensity to invest (i.e., to plunge), with environmental changes that reduce c tending to inhibit plunging and environmental changes that raise c tending to encourage plunging. Thus, it would be of interest to see how changes in various parameters affect this constant. Looking at equation (15), we note that c depends, on the one hand, on the function f representing the preference relation t and, on the other hand, on the DDF Go describing the rate of return on the risky security. To study the effect of a change in f consider two functions, f1 and f2, representing two preference relations, st and t2, respectively. Intuitively, if tl is more risk averse than t2, then f, will lie uniformly below f2. (For a more rigorous discussion, see Yaari (1986) .) Thus, if > l is more risk averse than t2, then the corresponding respective values of c in (15), call them cl and c2, will satisfy cl < c2: Increased risk aversion inhibits plunging, and, as we might expect, the more risk averse the population the fewer the plungers.
Also of interest is the effect of a change in the distribution of returns on optimal behavior. In particular, one would like to know what the effect would be of an increase in the riskiness of the rate of return on the constant c. Consider two random variables, 01 It is interesting to note that the dual theory can serve as a building block in an alternative axiomatization of (17). The idea is related to a recent paper by Shubik (1985) . Suppose that an agent who faces a random variable v, belonging to V, acts in the following way: First, the agent considers the payment levels Gilboa (1985) to the case where uncertainty is totally subjective; i.e., "objectively" mixed acts are not necessarily available.) Now let us return to (17) and recall that the preference relation being treated there is over random variables, with some underlying probability measure, P. Defining a nonadditive measure tt by tt =fo P, we find preferences being 
